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The Liar and the Loophole
CORPORATE CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND
IMPEACHMENT
INTRODUCTION
The modern corporation has the potential to wield
tremendous power and influence, and as the American legal
system has increasingly treated corporations as legal persons,1
that potential has grown. But this trend has led to uncertainty
about whether certain rights and regulations should be applied to
corporations under corporate personhood principles.2 One such
uncertainty relates to whether the rules governing the
admissibility of character evidence should apply equally to
corporations and individuals. The Federal Rules of Evidence
narrowly limit the use of evidence of a person’s character to show
propensity, but they do not discuss the admissibility of evidence of
a corporation’s character.3 Likewise, the character evidence ban’s
exceptions—which allow a witness to be impeached by evidence of
his untruthful character—are silent on corporate impeachment.4
The Rules should thus be amended to clarify whether corporate
character evidence should receive the same treatment as
character evidence for natural persons.
To illustrate the need for increased clarity in the Rules’
treatment of corporate character evidence, consider the following
1 Beth Stephens, Are Corporations People? Corporate Personhood Under the
Constitution and International Law: An Essay in Honor of Professor Roger S. Clark, 44
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4 (2013); see, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 365 (2010) (holding that the “[g]overnment may not suppress political speech on
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”).
2 See generally Stephens, supra note 1 (discussing the inconsistency between
the Supreme Court’s treatment of corporations as people under constitutional law and the
Second Circuit’s failure to do so under international law); see also Allan G. King & Syeeda
S. Amin, Social Framework Analysis as Inadmissible “Character” Evidence, 32 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 25 (2008) (“For example, corporations enjoy a Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, but they do not have a Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.”); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1441 (1987) (“[A] modern lawyer
knows only that a corporation is considered a legal person but finds that terminology
devoid of content.”).
3 See FED. R. EVID. 404.
4 See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
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example: a car manufacturer is the defendant in a class action in
which the plaintiffs allege that the company negligently failed to
recall a defective model that caused many accidents and injuries.
The company argues that it had no knowledge of the defect at the
time of the accidents. At trial, the company testifies, through a
corporate representative, that none of its employees had
knowledge of the defect. The plaintiffs would like to impeach the
corporate representative with evidence of the company’s prior
untruthful acts, such as the destruction of evidence in recent
cases. The plaintiffs would also like to call a former employee of
the company to testify—based on the employee’s opinion and the
company’s reputation—to the company’s character for
untruthfulness. Due to the Federal Rules’ focus on individuals, it
is unclear (1) whether the plaintiffs are prohibited from
introducing evidence of the company’s character to show a
propensity for untruthfulness, and (2) if so, whether the corporate
representative may be impeached by such evidence under the
exceptions to the character evidence ban.
It is a core principle of modern jurisprudence that the goal
of the trial process is to try cases, not people,5 and the limitation
of character evidence is in line with that aspiration. Courts have
long acknowledged the prejudicial dangers of character evidence,6
which can influence jurors to make decisions based on their
perception of a person’s character, rather than on the merits of
the case at issue.7 This common law aversion to character
evidence is codified in Rule 404, which prevents the use of various
types of character evidence “to prove that on a particular occasion
5 Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal
Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REV. 533, 533 (1992) (explaining that “a jury
must consider only the facts of a particular case, not a defendant’s general character or
prior bad acts, in reaching a proper verdict”); see also United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d
517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“It is fundamental to American jurisprudence that ‘a
defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is.’” (quoting United States v.
Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977))); People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504
(Mich. 1988) (“[I]n our system of jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than persons, and
thus a jury may look only to the evidence of the events in question, not defendants’
prior acts in reaching its verdict.”).
6 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (“The inquiry
is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The
overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is
the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues,
unfair surprise and undue prejudice.”); see also Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins.
Co., 672 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[C]haracter evidence is generally excluded
because it is viewed as having slight probative value and yet may be very prejudicial.”
(citing Reyes v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 589 F.2d 791, 793 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979))).
7 David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition:
Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1184 (1998).
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the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.”8
Subsection (a) contains a general prohibition on the use of
character evidence to prove propensity, and subsection (b)
prohibits the use of a person’s prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts
to prove propensity.9
The Rules do allow for the use of character evidence to
prove propensity in limited circumstances. Rules 608 and 609,
for example, allow character evidence to be admitted for
purposes of impeachment.10 The Rule 608 exception is commonly
utilized to introduce evidence of a witness’s untruthful
character—in the form of opinion, reputation, or prior bad acts—
to attack a witness’s credibility.11 The character evidence
exceptions have created controversy among legal scholars, who
have questioned whether evidence of a person’s character for
truthfulness should be admissible to call into question the
person’s likelihood of testifying truthfully.12 On one hand, it
seems intuitive that someone who has acted untruthfully in the
past is more likely to lie during testimony than someone with an
unblemished record. And informing a jury of a witness’s tendency
to lie may properly lead the jury to take an untrustworthy
witness’s testimony with a grain of salt. On the other hand,
evidence about bad acts or character for truthfulness may not
provide significant information about a witness’s likelihood of
telling the truth in a particular case.13 Because there are
arguments to be made for and against the existence of the
impeachment exceptions, complete consensus is unlikely.
The issue of whether character evidence should be
admissible for impeachment increases in complexity when it is
adjusted to ask whether a corporation’s vicarious testimony
through a corporate representative should be impeachable by
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
FED. R. EVID. 404.
10 FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
11 FED. R. EVID. 608 (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by
testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character.”).
12 See, e.g., Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation
for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (arguing “that the practice of using convictions
for impeachment in the civil setting be abolished”); Richard D. Friedman, Character
Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian[!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 637, 638 (1991) (arguing that “an accused ought not be subjected to impeachment
offered to show that he has a poor general character for truthfulness”); Roger C. Park &
Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn,
47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 992 (2006) (“If [a criminal defendant] is guilty of a serious charge, the
situational pressures to lie are so strong that even a generally honest person likely would lie
to escape punishment; learning the fact that he was dishonest on an earlier occasion does
not change the odds much.”).
13 Friedman, supra note 12, at 638.
8
9
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evidence of the corporation’s character for untruthfulness. As one
court noted, “a corporation cannot testify as a witness but through
testimony of its employees and representatives.”14 But it is
unclear whether the Rules allow for a corporate representative to
be impeached with evidence of a corporation’s untruthful
character, without regard to the witness’s truthfulness.
An analysis of whether the character evidence rules
should apply to corporations involves answering several
underlying questions. First, can a corporation even possess a
“character” for the purposes of Rule 404? Second, under what
circumstances should evidence of a corporation’s character for
truthfulness be admissible at trial? Third, do the rationales for
prohibiting evidence of a person’s character apply with equal
force to corporations? Fourth, does the rationale for allowing
character evidence for impeachment purposes apply when a
corporation is testifying through a witness whose personal
character is not at issue?
This note argues that based on the traditional rationales
for the limitation of character evidence, courts are likely to
continue to apply Rule 404 to corporations. While commentators
have questioned the adequacy of the traditional rationales and
argued that courts should freely admit corporate character
evidence,15 the fact that these long-standing rationales are widely
accepted suggests that they will continue to prevail. Operating on
the assumption that Rule 404 applies to corporations, this note
argues that Rule 608 should also apply to corporations. This
would allow a corporate representative to be impeached by
evidence of a corporation’s untruthful character, and corporations
would thereby be held responsible for their dishonest acts.
Part I of this note provides a general discussion of
corporate personhood and character. It examines how a
corporation testifies vicariously through corporate representatives
and how that process affects impeachment. It then analyzes
whether a corporation’s tendency to lie in the past, or its prior bad
acts, increase the likelihood of a corporate representative lying
while testifying. Part II outlines the character evidence rules—
the character evidence ban in Rule 404 and the exceptions in
Rules 608(a) and 608(b). It examines the history and policy
14 Stone v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 02 CIV 3433 WHP, 2003 WL 22902564, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2003).
15 See, e.g., Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The
Applicability of the Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 778,
811 (2000) (arguing that the only adequate rationale for the character evidence
prohibition—“the law’s commitment to regard each person as ‘mentally free and
autonomous at every point in his life’”—does not apply to corporations); Robert E.
Wagner, Criminal Corporate Character, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1293, 1328 (2013).
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behind the rules and summarizes arguments for and against their
existence. Part III discusses how courts have applied the
character evidence rules to corporations—namely, that courts
have discussed the application of Rules 404 and 609, but not Rule
608, to corporations. Part IV considers whether Rules 404 and
608 should apply to corporations. It argues that courts will likely
continue to apply Rule 404 to corporations because the traditional
rationales justifying the rule’s application to individuals apply
with equal force to corporations. It then argues that Rule 608
should also apply to corporations, based on the rationales for the
character evidence exceptions—that prejudice is lower and
probative value is higher when character evidence is used to show
that a witness has a character for untruthfulness. Finally, the
note concludes that if Rule 404 continues to be applied to
corporations, then Rule 608 should be amended to explicitly
include corporations, and in the meantime, that courts should
“read in” Rule 608’s applicability to corporations.
I.

CORPORATE CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND VICARIOUS
TESTIMONY

A.

Corporate Character Evidence

It is well known that corporations today are afforded many
of the same legal protections as natural persons.16 In fact, Title 1
of the U.S. Code states that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’
include
corporations,
companies,
associations,
firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.”17 Corporations “can own property, participate in
binding legal contracts, can be sued in court (and in turn sue
others), and can be prosecuted and held responsible for criminal
actions.”18 Moreover, corporations “have both responsibilities and
rights that are independent of, and usually equal to, those of the
individuals who fund, work for, or manage the corporation.”19
Defenders of corporate personhood argue that corporations are
multidimensional entities that arise from human interactions and
play important social, economic, and political roles and
accordingly should be granted constitutional rights.20 Opponents

16 Stephens, supra note 1, at 4; see, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
17 Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
18 Wagner, supra note 15, at 1307.
19 Stephens, supra note 1, at 4.
20 Id.
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argue that corporate personhood can be more harmful to society
than beneficial.21
While there is ongoing disagreement about whether a
corporation should be legally defined as a “person,”22 it is perhaps
less controversial that a corporation can legally possess a
“character.” Still, the word “character” evades a simple definition,
and as a result, the character evidence prohibition has been
described as “one of the great enigmas in the law of evidence.”23
While it is tempting to equate propensity with character, the
Federal Rules of Evidence indicate that this is improper.24 Some
propensity evidence—for example, evidence of a person’s habit—is
admissible.25 Some might argue that corporations possess the
propensity to behave in predictable ways, but this is probably not
enough to justify a conclusion that a corporation can possess a
“character” for the purposes of the Rules.
To date, “there is no general agreement about the precise
meaning of [character].”26 Courts and commentators have put
forth a variety of definitions of character that range from
general to specific. For example, it has been proposed that
character is simply a “bundle of traits.”27 Similarly, and in the
context of character evidence, character has been defined to
include “a person’s general traits such as honesty, temperance,
or peacefulness” and to exclude more specific traits.28 By
contrast, Professor Susanna Kim has more narrowly defined
character as “a reflection or expression of a set of internal
principles and operations.”29

See, e.g., id.
See id.; see also Kent Greenfield, If Corporations Are People, They Should Act
Like It, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/ifcorporations-are-people-they-should-act-like-it/385034/
[http://perma.cc/FR8U-P9MM]
(discussing the backlash to corporate personhood in the wake of Citizens United).
23 Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on
Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1919 (2012).
24 David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 439, 450 (2001).
25 See FED. R. EVID. 406.
26 Leonard, supra note 24, at 450.
27 Kim, supra note 15, at 779.
28 5 KARL B. TEGLAND, EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 404.2 (5th ed. 2007).
29 Kim, supra note 15, at 783. Despite firmly arguing against extending the
character evidence protections to corporations, Professor Kim admits that corporations
can possess character as defined this way. Id. at 803 (“As independent persons and
moral actors, corporations have the capacity to develop a certain character.”). Professor
Kim argues that “[a] corporation is a unified and distinctive social person with an
existence that is separate from the human beings that compose it.” Id. at 789. She
argues further that “[t]he character of the corporation is part of its identity and
remains distinct from the identity of the corporation’s members.” Id. at 803-04.
21

22
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While these attempts to define legal “character” are not
without merit, the likelihood of consensus seems low.30 Indeed, the
Rules’ omission of a definition may have been an acknowledgement
of the difficulty of creating one.31 It is impossible to say whether a
corporation can possess “character,” because doing so would
require choosing arbitrarily from the differing definitions that
have been put forth. Rather than seeking an exact definition of
character, it is more productive to focus on the Rules’ treatment of
character evidence. While character can fit varying definitions
from a general perspective—anything from a “bundle of traits” to
a “reflection of internal principles”—a definition of character
evidence can be more narrowly approximated based on its
treatment in the Federal Rules.
Due to the obvious difficulty of defining character and the
conspicuous absence of a definition in the Rules, character
evidence must be defined separately from the definition of
character. Fortunately, defining character evidence based on the
purpose and function of the character evidence rules makes this
possible. Character evidence is information about a “person’s or
entity’s past conduct”32 that may indicate propensity but that
carries with it a high risk of prejudice.33 In other words, the
character evidence rules represent the view that when a person
or entity has done something in the past, it can, but does not
always, mean that the person or entity is likely to act similarly
in the future. Evidence of such past behavior, whether through
opinion, reputation, or specific examples, is the target of the
character evidence rules; the purpose of excluding the majority
of propensity character evidence is to prevent juries from
incorrectly assuming that character evidence actually indicates
propensity. When character evidence is defined with respect to
its function, corporations seem to fall within the definition’s

30 Anderson, supra note 23, at 1920 (“Unfortunately, as courts have recognized,
finding a judicially manageable definition of character is likely impossible.”); see also United
States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1998) (“We doubt that a fully satisfactory,
comprehensive definition of ‘character evidence’ is possible . . . .”).
31 Anderson, supra note 23, at 1923.
32 Wagner, supra note 15, at 1310.
33 Leonard, supra note 24, at 450 (“The primary reason evidence rules restrict
character evidence is the danger of unfair prejudice it engenders.”); see Anderson, supra
note 23, at 1920 (“In short, whether or not a proof involves character in the metaphysical
sense is unimportant; what actually matters is the proof’s logical relevance and
prejudicial effect on the jury.”). A growing number of scholars argue that character
evidence by definition includes a moral component. E.g., Anderson, supra note 23, at
1936; Kim, supra note 15, at 793; 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5233 (1978). This note will assume that
corporations can act morally and immorally.
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purview. Hence, it is necessary to look further into the
implications of regulating corporate character evidence.
B.

Vicarious Testimony

Assuming that corporate character evidence exists, the
next question is whether a corporation’s past truthfulness or
untruthfulness is relevant to a corporate representative’s
likelihood of testifying truthfully. By its plain language, Rule
608 allows character evidence that is probative of a
“witness’s . . . character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”34
But when a corporation is testifying vicariously through a
corporate representative, it is not clear whether that witness
may be impeached by the corporation’s prior acts, without
regard to the witness’s character for truthfulness.
Consider the car manufacturer example from the
introduction.35 Suppose the company is testifying through an
employee who is not connected to the company’s prior untruthful
acts, which include the destruction of evidence in an unrelated
case. Further suppose that there is no evidence to suggest that
the witness has ever been dishonest. Should the company be
permitted to suppress its prior dishonest acts of destroying
evidence simply by selecting a witness with no connection to the
acts and with no history of dishonest behavior? While justice
seems to be at odds with this tactic, an argument can be made
that this strategy is implicitly encouraged by Rule 608.
The central question regarding vicarious corporate
testimony is whether and to what extent a corporation’s
character for dishonesty actually affects the veracity of a
corporate representative’s testimony. It has been argued that a
corporate representative should only be impeached by evidence
of a corporate conviction36 when there is some linkage—
whether direct or indirect—between the witness and the prior
corporate conviction.37 Indirect linkage may exist when, for
example, the conviction was related to a corporate policy and a
corporate policymaker is testifying.38 When the linkage is
indirect, it is argued, the witness’s position in the corporate
hierarchy is relevant to a determination of whether the
FED. R. EVID. 608 (emphasis added).
See supra intro.
36 This type of impeachment is governed by FED. R. EVID. 609, which allows
for the introduction of evidence of a witness’s prior criminal conviction to attack the
witness’s character for truthfulness.
37 E.g., Steven L. Friedlander, Using Prior Corporate Convictions to Impeach,
78 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1337-38 (1990).
38 Id. at 1323.
34

35
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impeachment is proper.39 This makes sense when a corporate
policy is at issue: witnesses who rank highly in the corporate
hierarchy are more likely to have been involved in the creation
of an illegal policy, and they are, therefore, stronger candidates
for impeachment than those lower on the totem pole.40
But when impeachment evidence is related to a general
corporate character for untruthfulness, rather than a specific
corporate policy, the witness’s position in the corporate hierarchy
is less relevant. More relevant is whether the company is
predisposed to influence its employees to act untruthfully on the
company’s behalf. Commentators have discussed the existence of
corporate “ethos,” which “arises out of the dynamic of the
corporation’s individual members working together toward
corporate goals . . . [and] reflects an organizational personality
that is independent of the individuals who work within the
organization.”41 Not only can a corporate ethos influence
employees to commit dishonest acts, but it can also be specifically
designed to produce criminal activity.42 Pressures and incentives
are often built into the corporate system to influence employees to
commit illegal acts or even “take the fall” for the company in a
criminal prosecution.43 It stands to reason that such pressures
and incentives could just as easily influence a corporate
representative to lie on the stand. The corporate representative
may have a clean criminal record and a sterling reputation for
truthfulness but may also be facing significant pressure to testify
favorably for the corporation.
So it follows that a witness testifying on behalf of a
dishonest corporation is likely affected by the company and
cannot testify with complete autonomy. And in cases of corporate
criminality, “[t]he corporation should be held accountable under
the criminal law if the corporation, by establishing organizational
cultures that tacitly countenance crime, is the real party-inId. at 1338.
Id. at 1323 (“[I]t is legitimate to impeach corporate policymakers based on
the presumption that they either acquiesced in or authorized the behavior leading to
the prior crime. This presumption depends on the manager’s position in the corporate
hierarchy, and on the relationship of her position to the crime committed.”); see also
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[I]t is
generally true that high management officials, for whose conduct the corporate
directors and stockholders are the most clearly responsible, are likely to have
participated in the policy decisions underlying [violations] . . . .”).
41 Kim, supra note 15, at 798; see also Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A
Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099
(1991) (arguing that a corporate ethos “results from the dynamic of many individuals
working together toward corporate goals”).
42 Ann
Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better
Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1289 (1990).
43 Id.
39

40
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interest rather than the so-called ‘bad apple.’”44 Moreover,
“[c]haracter evidence may be quite useful in determining if the
corporation has established this type of culture, potentially
making the evidence very probative.”45 By the same token, when
corporations establish organizational cultures where dishonest or
evasive acts are a common practice, those corporations should be
held accountable in the form of impeachment of the corporation
itself, regardless of the individual witness who testifies on the
corporation’s behalf.
Having established, based on the foregoing discussion,
that corporations can possess character for the purposes of the
character evidence rules and that corporate forces can influence a
corporate representative’s testimony, the following issues emerge:
should the character evidence rules be applied to corporations,
and—considering the lack of clarity in the Federal Rules—how
likely is it that courts will do so? Answering these questions
requires an analysis of the policy rationales for the character
evidence rules. This analysis indicates that, although
commentators have put forth arguments against the prohibition
of corporate character evidence, the applicability of the traditional
rationales for the rules suggests that courts will continue to
prohibit such evidence. Accordingly, courts must allow for
impeachment of corporations’ vicarious testimony by recognizing
that Rule 608 applies to corporations.
II.

THE HISTORY AND POLICY BEHIND THE FEDERAL
CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULES

Rule 404, also known as the propensity rule, serves as the
primary limitation on character evidence by preventing the use of
character evidence to prove a defendant’s propensity to act in
accordance with the alleged conduct.46 Because Rule 608 functions
as an exception to Rule 404’s character evidence prohibition, an
inquiry into whether Rule 608 applies to corporations requires
first asking whether Rule 404 applies to corporations. If Rule 404
did not exist—that is, if character evidence was generally
permissible—there would be little use for a rule that specifically
allows the use of character evidence to impeach a witness.

44 Wagner,
supra note 15, at 1322 (quoting Charles R.P. Pouncy,
Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Responsibility: It’s All About Power, 41 STETSON L.
REV. 97, 110 (2011)).
45 Id. at 1322.
46 RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 345 (5th ed. 2014).
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Despite the fact that character evidence is often relevant
and can lead to sound inferences about a person’s tendency to
behave a certain way,47 there are several policy issues that
compelled the creation of the propensity rule. One issue is the
need to prevent juries from approving or disapproving of a person
or entity based on certain evidence of past behavior.48 Another
issue is that jurors may overestimate the probative value of
evidence of prior bad acts or criminal behavior.49 These rationales
exhibit the basic principle in the modern legal system that “a
defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is.”50
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized
that in some circumstances, the use of character evidence is
appropriate. For example, the Rules allow a criminal defendant
to bring evidence of his own good character to suggest that his
present conduct conformed to that character.51 And in criminal
cases where a defendant claims he acted in self-defense, the
defendant may present evidence of a victim’s bad character in an
attempt to demonstrate that the victim’s conduct conformed to
that character.52 The Federal Rules also allow the use of
character evidence to attack a witness’s credibility.53 Rule 609
allows for impeachment by evidence of a criminal conviction,54
and Rule 608 allows for impeachment based on evidence of
reputation, opinion, or specific instances of conduct.55
47 Anderson, supra note 23, at 1926 (“Using propensity reasoning, character
evidence would be logically relevant in a trial if offered to show that an individual
acted in conformity with their character or to attack a witness’s credibility on the
stand. Courts have long assumed that character evidence ‘is essentially relevant’
because of propensity reasoning, as Wigmore claimed.”); see also Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (“The [character evidence] inquiry is not rejected
because character is irrelevant . . . .”). The Michelson court goes on to state that
character evidence possesses “admitted probative value.” Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476.
48 LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 46, at 349.
49 Id. at 350.
50 United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); see also supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
51 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).
52 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B).
53 See LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 46, at 346.
54 See FED. R. EVID. 609.
55 See FED. R. EVID. 608. Rule 608 states:

(a) REPUTATION OR OPINION EVIDENCE. A witness’s credibility may be
attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having
a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of
an opinion about that character. But evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been
attacked.
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Except for a criminal conviction under
Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a
witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for
truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be
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The principle behind Rule 608 stems from the
assumption that a witness’s past behavior is indicative of
present truthfulness or untruthfulness. For example, the Rule
reflects the idea that “because a witness has acted in certain
ways in the past, she is more likely to lie in her testimony.”56
This rationale appears to be at odds with one of the primary
rationales for Rule 404: that character evidence is often
prejudicial and only minimally indicative of the conduct at
issue. Why should evidence of prior lying be admissible to
prove a propensity to lie if prior conduct is inadmissible to
prove a propensity to engage in similar conduct?
The common law that led to the drafting of the federal
character evidence rules helps answer this question. The
perceived need to exclude character evidence has existed for
centuries in both English and American law,57 and the
permissibility of character evidence to call into question a
witness’s veracity also has roots in English law.58 Considering
the history and policy of character evidence rules is thus
helpful in determining the principles that inform our modern
federal rules limiting the admission of character evidence.
A.

The Character Evidence Ban: Rule 404

While character evidence was readily used to prove
conforming conduct in early English common law, there are
indications that limitations were placed on this practice as early
as 1692.59 With the Enlightenment came a desire to conduct trials
as “‘scientific’ . . . search[es] for truth.”60 The concept of “proof”
moved away from a demonstration of the relative merits of
parties’ characters and toward a system of establishing facts,

inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined
has testified about.
By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege
against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness’s
character for truthfulness.
Friedman, supra note 12, at 645.
See Leonard, supra note 7, at 1164-65.
58 Janeen Kerper & Bruce E. MacDonald, Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b): A
Proposed Revision, 22 AKRON L. REV. 283, 285 (1989).
59 Leonard, supra note 7, at 1168.
60 Id. at 1195.
56

57
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separating public and private lives, and judging people by their
acts and not by who they are.61
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy reflected
this idea that society should focus on a person’s acts, rather than
his inner character.62 Immanuel Kant wrote in 1797 that a court
should only punish a person who committed a crime and not to
“promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil
society.”63 In America, the political philosophies embedded in the
text of both the Declaration of Independence and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution embrace similar
principles.64 The Declaration of Independence’s proclamation
that “all men are created equal”65 and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s requirement that no state may “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”66
both encompass the notion that a person should be judged based
on his actions and not his character.67
This growing animosity toward the use of character
evidence coincided with—and was likely related to—
industrialization.68 Prior to industrialization, society was largely
agrarian, families were self-sustaining, and people maintained
fewer connections outside the home.69 The relationships that did
exist were more personal, and people relied on knowledge of the
character of those they worked and lived with.70 Because people
felt able to determine the character of the people they frequently
interacted with, the common law trial frequently made use of
character evidence.71 But with industrialization came more
frequent but less personal human interaction.72 “Ironically,
though urbanization brought a growing percentage of the
population together into closely packed cities, the very fact that
it was necessary to deal with so many people and business
entities on a day-to-day basis made it impossible to know very
many people very well.”73 The complexities of urban
relationships thus mandated a movement away from using

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Id. at 1200 n.170.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Leonard, supra note 7, at 1200 n.170.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
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character analyses to determine personal responsibility,74 and as
close personal relationships became less common, character
testimony became disfavored.75
By the early nineteenth century, the character evidence
prohibition was well established in England. An early nineteenthcentury evidence treatise discussed an 1810 case in which an
English court prohibited evidence that a defendant had previously
committed a crime similar to the one for which he was being
tried.76 Later in the nineteenth century, the rule had been firmly
established in American law, but it had already proved
controversial. In 1872, for instance, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court expressed disapproval of the character evidence rule but
acknowledged its existence and universal acceptance.77
Beyond the general philosophies and historical trends
that led to limitations on the use of character evidence, there
are also several practical rationales for the limitations.
Although character evidence easily clears the low hurdle of
relevancy,78 significant obstacles remain, the most important of
which is the danger of unfair prejudice. The admission of
character evidence triggers two types of unfair prejudice. The first
type is “inferential error prejudice,” where a juror is likely to
overestimate the degree to which the evidence is probative of guilt
of the present charge.79 The second type is “nullification
prejudice,” where a juror “might take the proof of [character] as
justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present
charge.”80 For example, a jury influenced by nullification prejudice
might convict a defendant because the defendant’s prior acts
indicate he is a bad person who deserves to be punished—and not

Id.
Id. at 1196.
76 Id. at 1170 (citing SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 70 n.b (J. Butterworth & Son eds. 1814) (discussing Rex v. Cole)).
77 Leonard, supra note 7, at 1172 (citing Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H.
401 (1872)).
78 Irrelevancy is not a primary rationale for excluding character evidence. The
Federal Rules set a low bar for establishing relevancy: Rule 401 deems relevant material
having “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added). Moreover, scholars have long argued that
reliable inferences can be drawn from acts that conform to character. E.g., Leonard, supra
note 7, at 1182; JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 57, at 118081 (3d ed. 1940). As a result, if not for the character evidence ban, such evidence would
readily be introduced and easily admitted under Rule 401.
79 Leonard, supra note 7, at 1184.
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Carrillo,
981 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Character evidence is not excluded because it has
no probative value, but because it sometimes may lead a jury to convict the accused on
the ground of bad character deserving punishment regardless of guilt.” (citing United
States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1268 (5th Cir. 1991))).
74
75
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because the jury is certain that the defendant committed the
crime at issue.
Additional rationales for excluding character evidence
are the dangers of surprise, complication, and confusion.81
Although modern notice requirements eliminate most surprise
in trials,82 a party may introduce character evidence in a way
that catches the opposing party off guard. For example, a
defendant may have withheld information about prior bad acts,
expecting that the prosecution would not discover them, only to
be surprised by the prosecution’s introduction of the evidence
at trial.83 Dangers of complication and confusion also serve as
rationales for the ban on character evidence.84 The introduction
of evidence of prior acts, crimes, or other character evidence
can distract jurors from the issues at hand.85
Many of the dangers that the character evidence rules
seek to eliminate are addressed by Rule 403, which calls for the
exclusion of relevant evidence when “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”86 This balancing test, if conducted
properly, should eliminate most problematic character evidence.
But the drafters apparently considered Rule 403 to be an
insufficient filter and believed that character evidence’s
probative value is always outweighed by these balancing factors.
Rather than allowing character evidence to be introduced and
evaluated under a 403 balancing test, the drafters chose to
prohibit the evidence altogether.
B.

The Impeachment Exception: Rule 608

Although the use of character evidence to show propensity
is barred in most situations,87 the Federal Rules allow for the use
of character evidence to impeach a witness’s credibility if the
character evidence demonstrates the witness’s propensity to be
untruthful. Rule 608(a) states that “[a] witness’s credibility may be
attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation
for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”88 Rule
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Leonard, supra note 7, at 1185.
Id. at 1185 n.103.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1185-86.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
See FED. R. EVID. 404.
FED R. EVID. 608(a).
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608(b) allows for the use of evidence to prove specific instances of
a witness’s conduct to impeach the witness on crossexamination.89 The admissibility of character evidence for
impeachment purposes—despite Rule 404’s general ban—has
been attacked as “anomalous.”90 Indeed, it does appear to be
contradictory to allow for impeachment by evidence of a witness’s
character for truthfulness in light of the rationales for the general
exclusion of character evidence under Rule 404.91
Rule 608(b)’s authorization of impeachment by prior bad
acts reflects the English common law tradition that permitted
a barrister’s inquiry into a witness’s past to expose prior
conduct and attack the witness’s character by questioning the
likelihood that the witness’s testimony was truthful.92 There
was always the risk that counsel, in attacking a witness’s
character, would be tempted to bring up conduct that was not
relevant.93 English courts “trusted the gentlemanly discretion
of the members of the bar to avoid abuses of [impeachment].”94
American courts, however, felt the need to establish a set of
rules aimed at reducing the risk that lawyers would abuse the
right to introduce prior bad acts.95 It is likely that prior to the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, federal
courts generally prohibited impeachment by prior bad acts and
only allowed impeachment by prior criminal conviction.96 Most
states, however, permitted the use of prior bad acts to
impeach.97 Rule 608 was an attempt to incorporate the majority
rule among states into the Federal Rules.98
The drafters of the Federal Rules believed that the
rationales for Rule 404’s prohibition of the use of character
evidence to prove conforming conduct did not apply in the case of
impeaching a witness. There are several traditional justifications
for the allowance of character evidence for impeachment purposes
where it is otherwise disallowed to prove conduct. For example,
the Rule 608 exception is based in part on the belief that there is
a lower risk of prejudice when evidence of truthfulness is used to
attack credibility than when general character evidence is used
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 789-90 (1993).
91 See infra Section III.A.
92 Kerper & MacDonald, supra note 58, at 285.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 286.
97 Id.
98 Id.
89

90
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to prove conforming conduct.99 This is because evidence of
credibility should only impact the jury’s belief of a witness’s
testimony and should not speak to the substance of the claims.100
Moreover, a witness whose credibility is being questioned is
often not a party to the dispute and thus will not be legally
impacted by the case’s outcome.101
Another justification for Rule 608 is based on the
inapplicability of one of the traditional rationales for Rule 404:
that prohibiting character evidence to prove conduct incentivizes
the finding of better evidence.102 Character evidence, regardless of
its relevance, is an inherently weak form of evidence relative to
other types.103 Prohibiting character evidence gives lawyers the
incentive to introduce better forms of evidence, which leads to
more accurate fact finding. This is not necessarily the case,
however, when the goal is impeachment. The search for better
evidence is arguably more important and productive when its goal
is to find noncharacter evidence of a fact at issue, rather than to
find noncharacter evidence of truthfulness or untruthfulness.104
Despite the rationales for Rule 608’s existence, there are
those who strongly disfavor the character evidence exceptions.
While character evidence used for impeachment may be less
prejudicial than character evidence used to show conforming
conduct, the probative value of impeachment character evidence
may still be too low to justify the existence of the Rule 608
exceptions.105 Professor Richard Uviller criticized the impeachment
exceptions, calling into question three assumptions central to Rule
608. First, Rule 608 assumes that a witness who has been
somehow dishonest in the past has demonstrated such disrespect
for truth that the witness’s propensity to testify honestly has been
forever diminished.106 Uviller illustrates the weakness of this
assumption, stating that under Rule 608, “a bystander who once
falsified an unrelated insurance claim is more likely to lie about
whether the getaway car contained two blacks or two whites than
is a witness of unblemished career.”107 Uviller’s scenario

LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 46, at 416.
Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th
Cir. 1982) (“[C]haracter evidence is generally excluded because it is viewed as having
slight probative value . . . .”).
104 Id.
105 Uviller, supra note 90, at 791-93.
106 Id. at 791.
107 Id.
99

100
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illustrates Rule 608’s failure to account for dissimilar instances of
untruthfulness where there is little common motivational ground.
Second, Rule 608(a) assumes that truthfulness and
untruthfulness are character traits that can be readily detected
by community observers and that a reliable community
consensus results from such observations.108 Here, Uviller
questions Rule 608’s assumption that one’s reputation for
truthfulness—as attested to by a supposedly reliable witness—
always reflects on one’s actual truthfulness. This assumption,
too, seems suspect, and perhaps, as Uviller puts it, “more
suitable to the nursery than the courtroom.”109
Finally, Uviller argues that Rule 608 is dangerous when
the target of impeachment is also a criminal defendant: Rule 608
incorrectly assumes that jurors are always capable of recognizing
the dishonesty’s probative value with respect to a defendant’s
testimony, without giving the dishonesty any weight with respect
to the criminal conduct at issue.110 Uviller highlights the tension
between Rules 608 and 404: Rule 404 aims to eliminate
prejudicial evidence, but Rule 608 carves out an exception for
evidence that may be highly prejudicial. Courts admit Rule 608
impeachment evidence, assuming—perhaps mistakenly—that
jurors will consider the evidence of truthfulness or untruthfulness
with respect to testimony and not criminal conduct. Uviller
questions whether that assumption is valid.111
III.

COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE
RULES TO CORPORATIONS

Courts have rarely addressed the issue of whether Rule
608 applies to corporations. Courts have, however, applied Rules
404 and 609 to corporations. In cases where Rule 404 has been
applied to corporations, courts have not provided much
enlightening discussion. Thus, it would appear that the courts
simply assumed that (1) corporations can possess character, and
(2) evidence of that character should not be admitted to prove
propensity. Where courts have applied Rule 609 to corporations,
the cases are even more telling: in invoking Rule 609 to allow
evidence of prior corporate convictions, courts have focused on the
vicarious nature of the testimony rather than the existence of
corporate character. These cases, along with the courts’ rationales

108
109
110
111

Id.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id.
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and subsequent scholarly analysis, suggest that Rule 608 would
likely also be applied to corporations.
A.

Courts Applying Rule 404 to Corporations

Courts have addressed corporate character evidence in a
variety of ways.112 Some courts have prohibited such evidence
without explanation.113 For example, in American National
Watermattress Corp. v. Manville,114 the plaintiff sued a waterbed
manufacturer after sustaining injuries caused by the company’s
product.115 The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence that the
company made no effort to recall the product after the injury
occurred, arguing that the company demonstrated “a pattern of
callous and indifferent conduct towards that rights of others.”116
The Alaska Supreme Court cited Alaska’s character evidence
prohibition117 and held that the evidence should not have been
admitted.118 Yet the court made no mention of the fact that it was
applying the character evidence ban to a corporation and not a
person.119 The court’s application of a state law version of Federal
Rule 404 with virtually no discussion of the “corporation vs. person”
debate indicates that the court assumed that the rule should apply.
Other courts have acknowledged that it is unclear
whether Rule 404 applies to corporations but have failed to come
to a conclusion one way or the other. In Colley v. CSX
Transportation, Inc.,120 for example, a Mississippi district court
stated simply, “[i]t is not clear that Rule 404(b) applies to
corporations.”121 The court, in concluding that the issue was
unclear, cited an analysis in Wright and Graham’s evidence
112 This Section discusses state court cases where the applicable evidence
rules are the state versions of Rule 404.
113 Kim, supra note 15, at 766; see, e.g., Am. Nat’l Watermattress Corp. v.
Manville, 642 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Alaska 1982); Stafford v. United Farm Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, 656 P.2d 564, 568 (Cal. 1983) (prohibiting evidence that invited a
jury to infer a union’s present negligence based on the union’s prior negligent act);
Bexar Cty. Appraisal Review Bd. v. First Baptist Church, 846 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993). Other courts have freely allowed propensity character evidence to be
used against a corporation. See, e.g., Allard v. Church of Scientology of Cal.,129 Cal.
Rptr. 797, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (allowing the introduction of a church’s policy
statements—which permitted members to “trick, sue, lie to, or destroy ‘enemies’”—to
suggest that respondents acted in accordance with the policy).
114 Am. Nat’l Watermattress Corp., 642 P.2d at 1331.
115 Id. at 1331-32.
116 Id. at 1335.
117 ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a), 404(b).
118 Am. Nat’l Watermattress Corp., 642 P.2d at 1336. Alaska’s character evidence
rules closely resemble the Federal Rules. FED. R. EVID. 404; ALASKA R. EVID. 404.
119 Am. Nat’l Watermattress Corp., 642 P.2d at 1335.
120 Colley v. CSX Transportation, Inc., No. 1:07CV1175HSOJMR, 2009 WL
1515524 (S.D. Miss. May 27, 2009).
121 Id. at *1.
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treatise, which discusses the ineffectiveness of both textual and
originalist approaches to corporate character evidence.122 The
treatise’s authors argue that the absence of clear definitions for
the words “character” and “person,” in addition to the lack of any
source from which to discover the intent of the Framers, results in
an analytical impasse.123
Unfortunately, an answer to the question of whether Rule
404 applies to corporations does not appear to be imminent. As
recently as 2012, the court in Ross v. American Red Cross124 cited
Colley for its conclusion that it is unclear whether Rule 404(b)
applies to corporations.125 The courts in both Ross and Colley did
not need to make a decision about whether Rule 404 applied
because they were able to resolve the cases on different grounds.
Because it seems as though courts tend to favor applying Rule
404 to corporations, however, doing so appears to be the status
quo for the time being. As a result, Rule 608’s application to
corporations is of great importance if corporations are to be held
accountable for dishonest behavior.
B.

Courts Applying Rule 609 to Corporations

Although there is a lack of case law regarding Rule 608’s
application to corporations, Rule 609, which operates as a
companion exception to Rule 608, has been applied to
corporations. Rule 609 governs the impeachment of a witness by
evidence of a prior criminal conviction. Entire corporations have
successfully been impeached under Rule 609(a), which, like Rule
608, is traditionally used to impeach a single witness, not a
corporation. Rule 609(a)(2) states: “evidence must be admitted if
the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of
the crime required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a
dishonest act or false statement.”126 There is some variation
among circuits in the few cases that have addressed the issue of
whether a corporation’s vicarious testimony can be impeached
under Rule 609(a).
Where courts have justified allowing corporate
impeachment under Rule 609(a), they have focused on the
relationship between the corporation and corporate representative

Id.; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 33, § 5233.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 33, § 5233.
124 Ross v. Am. Red Cross, No. 2:09-CV-00905-GLF-MRA, 2012 WL 2004810
(S.D. Ohio June 5, 2012), aff’d, 567 F. App’x 296 (6th Cir. 2014).
125 Id. at *4.
126 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
122

123
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who is testifying. For example, in Stone v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,127 the
court allowed for corporate impeachment under Rule 609.128 The
defendant argued that Rule 609 did not allow for impeachment of
a corporation—rather, it only allowed for the use of prior
convictions of “the witness,” and because the witness that the
plaintiff was trying to impeach was not convicted of a crime, the
impeachment was invalid. The court disagreed with the defendant
and noted that “a corporation cannot testify as a witness but
through testimony of its employees and representatives.”129 The
court held that the corporate representative’s testimony concerning
the corporation’s reputation was “fairly considered the testimony of
[the corporation] itself, and therefore was subject to impeachment
by [the corporation’s] prior felony convictions.”130
If the impeachment evidence in Stone was the
corporation’s prior dishonest behavior rather than a prior
criminal conviction, the Stone court’s line of reasoning would
result in the application of Rule 608 to the defendant
corporation. This is because the court did not focus on whether
the corporate representative was linked to the prior corporate
criminal conviction, but instead focused on the fact that the
witness’s testimony was the testimony of the corporation
itself—thus, the corporation’s prior acts, and not the witness’s,
were relevant to impeachment.131
In Hickson Corp. v. Norfolk Southern, a court again
allowed impeachment of a corporation’s vicarious testimony
through Rule 609(a).132 The court was unable to locate a case
that had dealt with the applicability of Rule 609 to a
corporation but stated:
[A] corporation can only act through the words and actions of its officers,
agents, and employees. When such [representatives] testify on behalf of
the corporation, in reality it is the corporation testifying. In such cases it
would be reasonable to allow impeachment just as if the corporation was
a person. Any other ruling would give the corporation an unreasonable
advantage under Rule 609 as compared to a natural person.133

127 Stone v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 02CIV3433 WHP, 2003 WL 22902564
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2003).
128 Id. at *1.
129 Id. at *2; see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988)
(“Artificial entities such as corporations may act only through their agents . . . .”).
130 Stone, 2003 WL 22902564, at *3. The court went on to state, “Any other
result would permit [the corporation] through its agent [ ] , to put its credibility at issue
through testimony about its alleged stellar reputation in the industry, without an
opportunity for plaintiffs to impeach that credibility.” Id.
131 Id.
132 Hickson Corp. v. Norfolk S., 227 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Tenn. 2002).
133 Id. at 905-06.
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Like the court in Stone, the Hickson court was mainly concerned
with the fact that the testimony was that of the corporation and
not of the witness. The court said nothing to suggest that this
rationale—that the corporation’s vicarious testimony justified
application of Rule 609—applies only when the impeachment
evidence is a prior conviction. Thus, the court would likely have
applied Rule 608 had it been implicated in Hickson.
IV.

APPLYING RULES 404 AND 608 TO CORPORATIONS

A.

Applying the Rule 404 Rationales to Corporations

As the existing case law demonstrates, there is no
consensus among courts about whether Rule 404’s character
evidence ban applies to corporations.134 Nor is there consensus
among courts about whether the ban should apply to
corporations.135 Generally, “courts simply assume that Rule 404
applies to corporations without analyzing the merits of that
position.”136 Although historical clues provide some guidance, the
traditional rationales for the character evidence rules that have
persevered for more than a century are even more useful to an
analysis of the applicability of the character evidence rules to
corporations. These rationales do not lose effect when the party at
issue is a corporation.
As discussed in Part II, the primary purpose of Rule 404
is to eliminate two types of prejudice—inferential error
prejudice and nullification prejudice.137 Recall that inferential
error prejudice “occurs when the factfinder assigns undue
weight to the evidence as evidence of guilt of the present
charge.”138 In other words, the danger is that “if [a jury] learn[s]
that a party has engaged in the misconduct charged on other
occasions, they may jump to the unwarranted conclusion that
the party committed the misconduct charged, regardless of the
strength or weakness of the noncharacter evidence on the same
134 See, e.g., Colley v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:07CV1175HSO-JMR, 2009 WL
1515524, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 27, 2009) (“It is not clear that Rule 404(b) applies to
corporations . . . .”); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 33, § 5233 (concluding that a
textual analysis of Rule 404 is not helpful to determining whether the character
evidence rule applies to corporations); Wagner, supra note 15, at 1318 (“It is currently
unclear whether a corporation’s past misconduct can be admitted to show the
corporation’s bad character and that it acted in conformity with that character on a
specific occasion.”).
135 Wagner, supra note 15, at 1318.
136 Id.; see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
137 Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 720
(1998); see also supra Section II.A.
138 Leonard, supra note 7, at 1184.
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question.”139 This risk is not diminished when a jury is
considering character evidence about a corporation. There is
nothing about inferential error prejudice that makes it unique
to situations where the subject of the character evidence is a
natural person—its definition focuses entirely on the factfinder’s inferential capabilities, rather than the party whose
character is in question. A juror is no less likely to assign
undue weight to a corporation’s prior bad act than to make a
misjudgment based on a natural person’s past behavior.
Similarly, nullification prejudice focuses on the fact-finder,
rather than the party whose character is at issue, and thus is
equally applicable to corporations. Recall that nullification
prejudice refers to “the danger that jurors could use proof of
character to justify a verdict irrespective of guilt.”140 The
likelihood of nullification prejudice is especially high in criminal
cases, where “a major concern is that character evidence will
tempt jurors to apply a theory of culpability that is based on
character rather than on the commission of a punishable act.”141
The worry is that character evidence tempts jurors “to give
litigants what they deserve, not what the law requires.”142 Like
inferential error prejudice, nullification prejudice has little to do
with the party whose character is at issue—it is instead
concerned with the fact-finder’s proclivity for emotional bias.
When a corporation’s character is being attacked, the danger of
nullification prejudice remains. In fact, nullification prejudice
may be even more likely when a corporation’s character is in
question, as “[i]t was pointed out almost a hundred years ago that
juries are more likely to find corporations guilty than they are to
find individuals guilty.”143 Indeed, when a jury knows that a
corporation possesses a bad character, the jury may be even more
likely to make a decision based on that character and not on the
facts of the case.
Despite the apparent applicability of Rule 404’s traditional
rationales to corporations, some commentators argue that the
character evidence ban should only apply to natural persons.144
For example, Professor Robert Wagner argues that Rule 404
should not apply to corporations because corporate character
evidence is “generally more probative than prejudicial for reasons
139 Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable
Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 223-24 (1996).
140 Anderson, supra note 23, at 1929.
141 Mendez, supra note 139, at 223.
142 Park, supra note 137, at 745.
143 Wagner, supra note 15, at 1306.
144 E.g., Kim, supra note 15; Wagner, supra note 15.
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ranging from the reliability of the evidence due to the corporate
structure, to the historical oddity that resulted in the initial ban,
to the increased ability of the corporation to defend itself, and to
corporations’ intentional development of their character.”145
Wagner argues that “it is possible that past acts are more reliable
indicators for corporations than they are for people.”146 While
Professor Wagner seems to give credence to the traditional
prejudice rationales, he argues that prejudice is outweighed by
the probative value of corporate character evidence.
Professor Susanna Kim, on the other hand, argues that
Rule 404 should not apply to corporations because the traditional
rationales for the character evidence prohibition “do not
constitute entirely adequate justifications for the ban.”147 Kim
argues that the only adequate rationale is the “human autonomy
rationale,” which by definition applies only to natural persons.148
The human autonomy rationale, Kim argues, is that “the use of
character evidence to prove individual conduct violates the law’s
commitment to regard each person as ‘mentally free and
autonomous at every point in his life.’”149 The proper reason for
disallowing character evidence, Kim argues, is that the use of
character evidence to prove a person acted in accordance with
that character implies that humans are not able to control their
own behavior and instead that their character determines how
they will act.150 Kim concludes that although corporations are
“persons” that can possess character, Rule 404 should not be
applied to corporations because the human autonomy rationale
does not apply to corporations.151
145 Wagner, supra note 15, at 1322-23. Professor Wagner argues that the
Federal Rules should be changed to clarify that the character evidence ban does not
apply to corporations. Id.
146 Id. at 1328.
147 Kim, supra note 15, at 774-75.
148 Id. at 768. Professor Kim argues that the inferential error prejudice rationale
is weak because it underestimates the inferential ability of jurors. Id. at 775. She voices
her faith in juries’ ability to properly weigh the probative value of character evidence,
arguing that “[i]t is questionable whether any one individual is better positioned than
another to know that jurors are making more out of character evidence than they should.”
Id. at 775-76. Kim also disposes of the nullification prejudice rationale, arguing that any
fear of nullification prejudice cannot be significant in light of the Rules’ exception for
character evidence that is used to prove facts other than conforming conduct. Id. at 776.
Kim argues that when character evidence is admitted to prove motive or intent, the
danger of a juror convicting based on the character evidence is the same as when it is
introduced to show conforming conduct. Id. Finally, Kim argues that rationales grounded
in efficiency and avoidance of complication of the issues are without merit. Id. Kim argues
that the frequent allowance of character evidence in other parts of criminal proceedings
“indicates that inefficiency itself is not the key rationale for the rule banning character
evidence.” Id. at 777.
149 Id. at 778.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 804.
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These commentators’ arguments are compelling and
present interesting reasons for limiting Rule 404’s application
to corporations; however, it remains unclear whether courts
will actually continue to apply Rule 404 to corporations. Kim’s
argument requires disposing of the traditional and widely
accepted rationales for the character evidence rule152 and
therefore represents a somewhat drastic approach. While Kim’s
human autonomy rationale may be the best reason for the
character evidence rule’s continued existence, it is unlikely that
courts will reject the traditional rationales and adopt Kim’s
rationale. Wagner’s argument, while recognizing that the
prejudice rationales may be valid when it comes to human
character evidence, gives a great deal of weight to the probative
value of corporate character evidence. It is unclear whether
courts will do the same.
Despite commentators’ arguments for the admissibility of
corporate character evidence, courts may be inclined to prohibit
such evidence in lieu of a textual change to the Rules. The
enduring nature of the inferential error and nullification
prejudice rationales weighs in favor of their continued
application, and courts may hesitate to adopt commentators’
arguments discrediting them. Because it remains unclear
whether courts will continue applying Rule 404 to corporations,
Rule 608’s application to corporations is of great importance. If
corporations cannot be impeached under Rule 608, then Rule
404’s application will offer corporations more character evidence
protection than is afforded to individuals.
B.

Applying the Rule 608 Rationales to Corporations

The likelihood that courts will continue to apply Rule 404
to corporations does not indicate that Rule 608 will receive the
same treatment. If, however, courts continue to apply Rule 404 to
corporations, it must be made clear that Rule 608 also applies to
corporations so that corporations are not able to manipulate an
impeachment “loophole” by testifying through a witness who is
unconnected to the corporation’s prior dishonest acts. The plain
language of Rule 608 does not make clear that corporations that
testify vicariously through witnesses may be impeached by prior
acts, opinion, or reputation. Because the rule instead focuses on
the witness’s reputation or prior conduct,153 it is not clear that a
corporation—when vicariously testifying through a witness with a
152
153

Id. at 775-77.
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
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clean record of truthfulness—can be impeached with character
evidence. Fortunately, because the rationales behind Rule 608
apply with equal force to corporations and individuals, and
because courts have applied the similar Rule 609 to vicarious
corporate testimony, there is good reason for courts to apply Rule
608 to corporations to prevent corporate manipulation of the
impeachment loophole.
As a threshold issue, a corporate representative’s
testimony should be considered the testimony of the corporation
itself, because the corporate structure creates the potential for
dishonesty. As discussed in Section I.B, a corporation can possess
an “organizational culture” that breeds dishonesty and pressures
employees to testify favorably for the company. And a
corporation’s “ethos” can not only influence its employees to
commit dishonest acts but can also be specifically designed to
produce criminal activity.154 This justifies the use of Rule 608 to
allow evidence that calls into question the general truthfulness of
a corporation, regardless of whether the corporate representative
is directly and personally tied to such untruthfulness.
When courts treat a corporate representative’s testimony
as the testimony of the corporation itself, there are several
justifications for applying Rule 608. First, the rationales for
allowing impeachment under the character evidence rules are
just as pertinent (if not more pertinent) for corporate
impeachment. One of the primary rationales for Rule 608 is that
probative value is higher, and risk of prejudice is lower, when
character evidence is used for impeachment.155 This effect is only
amplified for corporations—as Professor Richard Wagner argues
with respect to the character evidence prohibition, evidence of a
corporation’s character for honesty is highly relevant.156 And
under the traditional “probative versus prejudicial” balancing
test,157 instances of nefarious corporate culture or corporate
criminal acts are less prejudicial and more probative.158
The other Federal Rules’ treatment of corporate activity
sheds light on the drafters’ beliefs about corporate character
evidence. Rule 406 allows the introduction of evidence of “a
person’s habit or an organization’s routine practice” to prove a
party acted in accordance with that practice or habit.159 The
Foerschler, supra note 42, at 1289.
LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 46, at 416.
156 Wagner, supra note 15, at 1322-23.
157 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
158 Wagner, supra note 15, at 1322-23.
159 LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 46, at 379. Habit is defined as “one’s regular
responses to a repeated [specific] situation.” Id. at 381.
154
155
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rationale for Rule 406 is that it is more appropriate to draw
inferences based on a person’s habits, or a corporation’s business
practice, than to draw inferences based on a person’s character. In
fact, in the Rules’ “strength-of-inference continuum,” business
practice is even more conducive to inference drawing than habit,
and it sits at the opposite end of the spectrum from character.160
This recognition of the inferential value of corporate activity
weighs in favor of allowing for impeachment based on corporate
character evidence. Although prior acts that speak to a
corporation’s untruthfulness may appear to be propensity
evidence, if a corporation’s routine business practice is to respond
to a given stimulus in an untruthful way, there is a case to be
made that strong inferences can be drawn about the truthfulness
of its vicarious testimony. Moreover, opinion and reputation
testimony under Rule 608(a) can offer evidence that a corporation
regularly responds to certain acts in untruthful or evasive ways,
and opinion and reputation testimony should thus be admitted to
call into question the veracity of a corporation’s testimony.
Finally, courts’ application of the Rule 609 exception to
corporations161 weighs in favor of courts giving corporations the
same treatment under Rule 608. Like Rule 608, Rule 609 focuses
textually on the individual witness, to the detriment of clarity
about the Rule’s applicability to corporations. One commentator
argued that “[b]y its plain language, Rule 609(a) applies only
when the witness himself has been convicted of a crime. Since
the corporate entity is a legal fiction and without corporeal
existence, it cannot be a witness at trial.”162 Therefore, under its
plain language, Rule 609(a) can never be used to impeach a
corporation, “because the corporation, not the witness on the
stand, will be the one with a previous conviction. Thus, the
current language of 609(a) prevents the jury from learning of
important evidence that would better allow it to assess the
credibility of a corporate representative.”163 Rule 609’s plain
language should therefore be modified to state that the Rule can
be used to impeach a corporation.
Fortunately, although the language of Rule 609 does not
guide courts in how to apply the Rule to corporations, as
discussed in Section III.B, courts like those in Stone and Hickson
have admitted impeachment evidence under Rule 609 anyway.

160
161
162
163

Id. at 385.
See supra Section III.B.
Friedlander, supra note 37, at 1333.
Id.
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The scholarly response to this practice has been favorable. For
example, one commentator wrote of Hickson:
This is the first time we have seen a corporation’s criminal
conviction offered as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a). If a
corporation can testify vicariously through its officers or employees,
a logical inference, then there is no reason why a conviction would
not be admissible to impeach the corporation’s credibility, as placed
in issue through testimony by its representatives.164

By the same token, the plain language of Rule 608 applies only
to the reputation or conduct of the witness and not the
corporation for which she is testifying. But according to the
purpose of the rule, the reputation and conduct of the
corporation should be admissible to impeach the corporation’s
testimony via any corporate representative. Despite the lack of
textual clarity in Rule 608, courts should allow corporate
impeachment under Rule 608 the same way the court allowed
corporate impeachment under Rule 609 in Hickson.
Although courts have allowed for corporate impeachment
under Rule 609,165 it is uncertain whether courts will consistently
do so for either of the impeachment exceptions. Unfortunately,
this means that corporations currently have the ability to cover
up a track record of dishonesty by vicariously testifying through a
witness that cannot be impeached. Rule 608’s focus on individuals
rather than corporations allows a court to refuse to implement
Rule 608 for corporations based on the Rule’s plain language.
Therefore, the rules should be amended to explicitly indicate that
corporations’ prior bad acts and reputation can serve as a basis
for impeachment under Rule 608. Until that time, courts should
apply the character evidence impeachment exceptions to
corporations, because doing so is in line with the purpose of the
rules—to give fact-finders pertinent information about whoever,
or whatever, is testifying.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Evidence limit the use of character
evidence to specific instances, including the impeachment of a
witness. The character evidence rules focus textually on
individuals, and thus it is unclear whether they apply to
corporations. The principal traditional rationales for the ban on
17 Fed. Litigator (West) No. 12, at 312, 2002 WL 31154954.
Stone v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 02 CIV 3433 WHP, 2003 WL 22902564, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2003); Hickson Corp. v. Norfolk S. Rwy., 227 F. Supp. 2d 903
(E.D. Tenn. 2002).
164
165
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character evidence are concerns about inferential error prejudice
and nullification prejudice, and the dangers of both types of
prejudice are at least as concerning when a corporation is a party.
This is because juries are more likely to find corporations guilty
and thus are more likely to succumb to both types of prejudice
with respect to corporations.
Similarly, the primary rationale for the impeachment
exceptions to the character evidence rules—that prejudice is
lower and probative value is higher when character evidence is
used to impeach—is at least as applicable when a corporation
is a party as when an individual is a party. This is because a
corporation’s bad acts that demonstrate untruthfulness are
often likely to be part of a general business practice.
Corporations’ profit-driven nature, along with the systems that
are regularly put in place to respond to specific stimuli, suggest
that a corporation’s character for untruthfulness is probative of
a corporate representative’s likelihood of testifying truthfully.
Unfortunately, the Federal Rules that codify the impeachment
exceptions to the character evidence ban do not make clear that
a corporation’s vicarious testimony can be impeached in the
same way as an individual’s.
Therefore, Rule 608 should be amended to explicitly
state that corporations may be impeached regardless of the
corporate representative’s character for truthfulness, as long as
character evidence relating to the corporation’s character for
untruthfulness can be established. In the meantime, courts
should apply the impeachment exceptions to the character
evidence rules to corporations, because the purpose of the
rules—along with the rationales for their existence—apply
with equal force to corporations.
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